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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
DUA NE ROYLANCE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
- vs. STEPHEN L. DAVIES,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.

10641

REPLY BRIEF

Tlw argument and authorities of Respondent's Brief
arP direded almost entirely at Point I of Appellant's
art,"liment that there was insufficient evidence of willful
misconduct to permit recovery by a guest. This reply
briPf is a response to the authorities relied upon by Respondent in his Brief on this point.
The cases cited by Respondent m many instances
me from jurisdictions having statutes which require
only a showing o.f gross negligence rather than willful
mi:sconduct in order to allow a guest to recover against
his host.
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Respondent cites the case of LeFeave v. A,,!
(Mass., 1935) 198 N.E. 251 (Brief, p. 10),as an ilhi;,1
tion of evidence which a court has allowed a jury to 1.,
sider in determining tlw issue of gross n0gligene<'. JJi.
ever, as po·inted out in Appellant's brief, this court 1
always recognized and maintained the distinction hPt11,
the evidence nPcessary to show gross negligl'nC(' anrl:
evidence required in order to prove willful nliscomL:
If we examine the facts of the LeF em·e case, it is <JbnJ
that there \\nas a great deal more Pvidence in that t<'
than in th0 present action which would have all11:1
the jury to determine the question of gross neglig~r.
but it is no·t by any means clear that the jury \\·ould lw.
been allmn'd to consider thos(' facts if the issue had 111
willful misconduct. In the Lfli'ecwe case, the court sta:
that the road was "vPry ie~r, VPry slippery and ,.,,
trParhPrnus ''; tht~ ddc·rnla11t was drivini; up a str'L'p l11i
it was frnpossible to Sf~e ahead for more than 7:J 1·,,,·
there was a sharp curve at the top of the hill; and it'"'·
under these conditions that the driver pulled out to 11n,
a truck going up the hill. As the defendant driver pnlli
out to pass, one of the plaintiffs said, "Joe, don't ,J,
that,'' but the defendant driver continued to pas~ ti:
1

truck. Upon all of the above stated factors, including !1

1

warning by one of the plaintiffs, the court allowP<l ti:·
question of gross negligence to go to the jury.
In the case presently before this court, there is Ii'
evidence o.f this disregard for the safety of others

Hil
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poni JHdgm!'nt on the part of the driver. There was no

:-:ltowi11g that the speed was excessive; there was no
\\ arn rng of any sort from the plaintiff passenger which
. ,-a:-- disrPgardC'd by the defendant driver; and there was

iqiparPnt dang0r such as passing on a hill in a snow
~'lnrm witl1 visibility of only 75 feet.
n.i

Childs n. Badzcvich, (D.C. Cir., 1943), 139 F.2d 374
rited by HPspondent (Brief p. 12) involved a statute
>d1ich rPqnin•d a showing of grnss nPgligence or willful
nrnl wanton regard of the safety of the guest. A reading
of' tlw eourt's opinion in this 0ase shows that tht> d<'ri:-;1011 restl•d upon the gross negligPnce standard.

'!'he roud in the Childs case held that the question
ronld go to the jury on facts ·which were as follows: that
i1 wa:-; raining and a w•ry dark night; that as the defrndant's automohilf> approached the intersection he accelernt0d hiR spePd to approximately 50 miles an hour; failed
to lwrd a stop sign protecting the intersection; drove
at thP same high speed on the paved portion of the road
which began at the intersection and which was slippery
ns a result of the rainfall. On reaching the paved section
of the road, the car went out of control, skidding from
111w ~;idP to thP other for a distance for more than 300
frd where it struck a telegraph pole some 12to14 inches
i11 llJmll<'t(•r, broke it off and careened to the opposite
si<lL· of tlw road where it stopped. On these facts the
court held that a jury was entitled to determine whether
t ltl' n0gl u.;eneP was merely ordinary or gross.
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The case presently before this court contains 110 eiidence or proof of facts of such a drastic nature a1Hl eri
dencing such an obvious disregard for the consequ(~nci"'
which may result. The cause of the accident in the pre~ 1, 1 i
case was simply that the front wheel hit an obscured olJ
struction whipping the steering wheel out of the hanrl~ r,:
the driver and causing the car to veer from its coursr Dnu
to collide with a metal lighting pole.
The ease of Miller v. Erickson, (2d Cir., 1935) 7G P.~1\
599 (Brief p. 13), also involved a :;tatute requiring onl.'
gross negligence.
Respondent argues that although Davies luww tli1·
post was there, he did not see it. (Brief p. 15) The test:mony in tlw rc>cord docs not substantiate this statrrnc1:1
Davies knew the post was there and the object he faibl
to see or to anticipate what effect it would have on slfTr
ing the car was the cement abutment which was not JlMI
of the light po.st. Striking this abutment forced tlw
steering wheel out of his hand and the car veered into tht
post which he otherwise ·would have cleared.
The above cases cited by Respondent in support of
his argument that the evidence in the Jffesent casr \rll.'
sufficient to go to the jury involved facts substantia!l.1
stronger for the plaintiff's case than is true of the rw
presently before this Court. Also in the above citl'd ca 01 ·'
the jury "\Vas only asked to determine whether the r·11 ii
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.Jncf. of the driver had reached the level of gross neglia :-;tandard which would require less evidence of
misl'on<luct to f!;O to the jury than would the question of
1.i illl'ul mis<'onduet.

gi•Jll'(',

f'ase of Buroker v. Brown, (Ind.~ 1961) 172 N.E.
~rl ~+9, is cited by Respondent (Brief p. 8) as a case which
,,p0aks of speed in •connection with other circumstances.
'TIJ(~

Tlte Con rt is rited as stating that:
"~While it is generally true that mere s1>e(•d
of itself does not constitute willful misconduct.
Y<~t there may be a point at which the speed bef'ame so excessive that the danger of injury to a
guest was probable at such extreme speed and
that thi8 might constitute willful misconduct.
N(•<'dless to say, the circumstances appearing in
each case must rule this point." (Respondent's
Rri0f p. 9)

The facts of this particular case are not cited by the
Re~pondent but it should he pointed out that the speed
of tlw car in that particular case was 85 to 90 miles per
hour \\'hirh had been maintain0d while driving through a
Slllall town. 'rhe court stated at p. 8;)1:
'' . . . The evidrncP in support of the wrdict
is that tlw driver drove the 1953 Chevrolet automobile for a distanrt> of two mil0s before the collision at a sustained sperd of 83 to 90 miles per
hour over a winding, wavy, blacktop highway with
which he was not familiar and on whirh there were
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spots of ice on bridges and shady placec; an(\ ,
sharp drop-off on each side of the pawm(;nt, a11 ;\
that immediately before the wreck appellant dror,.
the automobile at such unabated speed across.a
bridge and into a curve ·which was, from all 1)11
evidence, clearly apparent to him and upon ·wliic·h
it seemed like it was a slick place."
It is clear that in the present case there is no evidtnc·v
of such excessive speed that "the danger of injury t11 :1
guest was probable so as to constitute willful misconumt
under the case cited by Respondent. Nor do \H• hm·"
additional factors which support th<:> B11roker court in
its opinion.

Respondent citt>s Davis v. II ollou:ell, 326 Mich. fii:;
40 N.W. 2d 461 (1950) (Brief p. 5 ), as a case containin;.:
elemt>nts similar to thost• in tlw present cas<-. llo\\'('WL
a clost> examination of that opinion will indicate tlwn :1'
substantially more <:>videnc<:' upon which to presPnl n
jury question o.f willful misconduct than \Ve have in tli1·
present casP.
1

''

In the Davis case, both the plaintiff and def Pndanr
had been drinking at various locations and defendant
stated she had to have one more drink for thr road.
Testimony was that " . . . she [defendant] arted hilan
ous and gayer than normal and showed the infhwnce Ill
liquor." It was only after several requests that plaintirr
finally induced dt'fendant to leave. In disrussing the facl~
the court went on to point out at p. 642 that:
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"
At least four times before the accident,
plaintiff importuned her to decrease the speed.
'J'hes<' unheeded requests began when the car
rcachPd 35 mnes per hour and were repeated
th<>reafter. Mrs. Douglas became belligerent and
did not set>m to care what she was doing. The car
began to swerve to the right and then to the left
sid<> of the road, going further each time, and
plaintiff became terrified and begged the driver
to slow down. In response to the request that
she should not get off the ruts, she said, 'vVell,
tlwrP is no other cars coming,' and 'I might as
well have the road while nobody else wants it.' "
Thr• clefrndant did not take her foot off the accelerator
nnd reached a speed of at least 60 miles per hour, went
off tlw left side of the road and then across the road to
1hP right and hit a tree located 15 feet to the right of the
road. T~wn on tlwse extreme facts, the court was some11k1L reluctant to allow such evidence to go to the jury
and the rourt statPd at page 64-3:

the facts of the instant case are extremely close to the border line, we do not hold
that, as a matter of law, defendants are not liable.
Thi? danger of continuing to operate in the manner
sh!? was doing was called to the attention of Mrs.
Douglas but she wantonly and willfully refused
to exPrcise ordinary care and diligence ... She
made no attempt to slow down the car when it left
the west (wrong) side of thP road and did not
apply the brake until trawrsing the gutter on the
east side of the road. Her persistent <'onduct in
"~While
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the faee of impending hazard, so manjfest]y ,
paren~, together with all other_facts we haw ~·a1f1~;j
attention to, present a quest10n for the jury t"
pass upon."
· ·
In the prt>sent case thPre is no evidence of Rneh excessive speed on the part of the defendant Davit's. Tl!''
plaintiff had not made any complaint to tlw defPndai 11
as to his manner of driving and had found him to he:!
capable driver on other oecasions. H8 stated that ]1,.
<lid not have any cause to complain of the way the di·
fendant was driving that night. (R. 101 ). 'flwrf' j, n11
evidence in the present case, as in the casrs citPd h>- fo._
spondent, that therr was any fore>varning of any impending hazard which was manifestly apparent, or any wantr:n
and willful lack of care toward the safety of his guP~t.

Rodney r. Staman, 371 Pa. 1, 89 A. 2d 313 (195~). j,
C'ited (Brief p. 6) by Respondent as a casP in which ~r>1eral factors were taken into account in order to presPnt
a question of willful misconduct for the jury. Here again,
there was evidence of very excessive speed for existing
conditions, such speed being 75 to 80 miles an hour on n
curvy, wet, brick-top narrow road with a curve at tlw
bottom of the hill. It is also significant that tlw
<:>ourt mentioned that for the 51;2 miles along 1Yhich tlw
Sta.man car had traveled immediately prior to tla' accident, the road was "awful curvy," thus, seemingly to
give an indication of the warning of dangerous conili-
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tions to tlw drivPr ·who should have been aware of such
danger. Corn·0rning the facts necessary to prove willful
mise(1ndurt, ilH~ rourt statPd:

"It is sufficient to show . . . circumstances
tending to disclose that the motorist knows or
should know that an injury to his guest will he
1lte probable result of such conduct."
Tlw court went on to state:
" . . . Under these conditions, it was for the
jury to say whetlwr the driver of the Staman car
with 'conscious and timely knowledge of an approach to an unusual danger and of common probability of injury to others . . . proceed[ed] into
the presence of the danger with indifference to
ronseqrn'nc0s and with ahsPnre of all care.' If he
did, tlwn he ·was guilty of willful and wanton mis(·onduct under the Ohio statutf'."
Respondent ·with reference to defendant Davies
argues that merely because the willful and wanton misronduct began only seconds before the inflicted injury
:-liouldn't prejudice the plaintiff's case. (Brief p. 8).
His claimed that the willful and wanton misconduct must
hq1,·in some place and why not j1.rnt before the accident.
This arg-11111Pnt shmvs the \\'('['.~ml'SS of the Respondent's
casP. ,\Yhil(' split second willfulness and \rnntonness may
lw possible, the shorter tlH' tinw period over which evidPlll'P of willfulness is shown tli\' stronger the evidence
lllllst ),p to substantiate such a finding. The evidence of
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willfulness in the present case does not even reat'] 1 tli.,.
level of the cases cited by Respondent which inYolwr)
such conduct over a consid1c~rable period of time and ll1Jt
just a matter of sc>conds.
In order to rc>cover, RPspondent must prove drfeud
ant's state of mind was willful and wanton. Tlwn• iR in
sufficient evidence to find that Davies with ''consein11
and timely knowledge of an approach to an unusal clan.c1,
and of common probahility of injury to others ... 1m,
ceeded into the presence of the danger, with indiffn1 w"
to consequences and with absence of all care." Tlwn j,
no evidence in the record of such knowledge or an imlif
ferent state of mind on thl' part of defendant Davies. TJi,
evidence shows that this accident completely surpri,ed
the driver of the automobile (R-80). The drivrr li::·I
no prim l.:nmd<•dg(' or un~· indication \diakver that];.
was headed into probahle injury for his guest. Davi,,,
liad traveled this arPa several times before in both 1li1wtions and knew the location of the poles and was driYiJ!':
to avoid these poles as lw had in the past and al' otii
cars would have had to do in parking along this ~rcti011
The accident was cam;ed by the fact that the front whrPI
hit a cement abutment which the driver did no.t see and
spun the wheel out of his hand throwing the car to 1h
right and into the stf•el utility pole. (R 79).
1"

1
•

Respondent claims that the Rodney case, su1Jra, i'
similar to the present case in that the host driver in both
cases was on the wrong side of the road. This is rnii

11
in that the car in the Rodn<'y case was on the
\\Tong side• of the traveled portion o.f the road and was innlh ('d m a head-on collision with oncoming traffic. In
i Iii· Jll'CS<'n t f'aS<' Davies was driving in a parking area
rnr ,tor('s along the street. This was not a traveled por1i(Jn of ihc• roadway and, in fact, was separated from the
11 ·,iYt·k<l po rt ion of the roadway by steel utility poles.
1.. a(linp:

He:spornfont also states (Brief p. 8) that the present
ea~r is :-;imilar to the Rodney case in that driving the autollltJbilr under tlw conditions heretofore set forth with all
of tl1e olrntacles and knowl0dge on behalf of Davies CPrtainly shows wanton misconduct as ckarly as if the
(Hendant had said "Here I go regardless of the consequrncrs." The record wholly fails to rnpport such a
'tatPment on behalf of Respondent. In the same paragraph Hespondent makes the statement that Davies knew
of rach and every one of the hazardous conditions
aml yet willfully traveled from the correct path into
"certain prril." This statement, Respondent claims, is
\1·holly uncontradicted by the defendant Stephen Davies.
A 1-lrarch of the record wholly fails to support this
~tatement and it is interesting to note that nowhere has
RPsponclPnt cited pages in the l'l'cord to justify such inr·r1nrct statPnwnts.

CONCLFRION
rl1hr anthoriites cited and tlw argument presented by
R1·:--110Jtdent fail to support a finding that there was suffi-
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cient evidence of willful misconduct to permit recovet\
hy a gueRt.
To find a willful and wanton state of mind on snl'\. ·
minimal facts as are present in this case would be to all11v.
a jury to consider the question of willfulness in ev~1
ordinary accident case and to completely circumvent 11
guest statute.
1,.

This verdict should be set aside and judgment 1·t!
tered in accordanee with the defendant'H motion fn1
directed VPrdict.
Respectfully submitted,

SKEEX, \VORSLEY, SKO\Y t\
CHRISTENSEN
701 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

Att.orneys for Defendant
Appellamt

and

